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Double Jeopardy Issues in the Financial Sector; Outside Counsel
By Richard L. Stone and Jay Facciolo
Double jeopardy issues arise regularly in the financial, banking and commodities
industries1 where both civil and criminal statutes and penalties are used in successive
prosecutions by federal and state governments to sanction the same conduct.2
Recent Supreme Court and federal court decisions have established new standards
for determining when civil fines and other civil penalties constitute “punishment” for
purposes of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.3
These decisions indicate that where a civil penalty imposed by a federal or state
actor bears no “rational relation” to any actual damages caused, the penalty will be
characterized as punishment for purposes of the double jeopardy clause.
Even a penalty imposed pursuant to a civil statute that is rationally related to actual
damages caused may nonetheless be considered punishment if it is designed, even in part,
to serve both remedial and punitive functions.
United States v. Halper4 is the leading case analyzing double jeopardy issues
involving multiple punishments. In Halper, the defendant was convicted for submitting 65
false Medicare reimbursement claims in violation of the criminal false-claims statute.5
The defendant was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000. The U.S.
1

E.g., United States v. Furlett, 974 F2d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 1992) (violations of the Commodity Exchange
Act and its regulations involving illegal allocations by defendants of profitable commodity future trades to
themselves while “giving unprofitable trades to customers”); United States v. Rogers, 960 F2d 1501, 150405 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 817 (1992) (violations of federal securities laws involving
material misrepresentations to purchasers of tax shelters); United States v. Woods, 949 F2d 175, 176-77 (5th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1562 (1992) (savings and loan placed into receivership, owner then
charged with bank fraud); United States v. Morgan, No. 3:93 CR 00212 (TFGD), 1994 WL 91048, at *8 n.
1 (D. Ct. Jan. 21, 1994) (misapplication of bank funds and bank fraud involving a federal savings and loan
association); SEC v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 121 (D.D.C. 1993) (disgorgement of profits for violations
of §§10(b) and 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); United States v Marcus Schloss & Co.,
724 F.Supp. 1123, 1124 (SDNY 1989) (violations of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984); State v.
Darby, 587 A2d 1309, 1311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (violations of New Jersey’s Uniform
Securities Law).
2
It is well established that the double jeopardy constitutional protections apply to multiple prosecutions by
the same sovereign only, but not to successive prosecutions by dual sovereigns; i.e., federal and state
successive prosecutions are not prohibited. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (state
prosecution after federal); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (federal prosecution after state).
3
“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘No person shall … be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb …’ The double jeopardy clause protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction and multiple
punishments for the same offense.” Montana v. Kurth. No. 93-144, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4440, at *5 n.i. (June
6, 1994) This article addresses the third prong of the double jeopardy clause.
4
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
5
18 USC §287 (1986).
Reprinted with permission from the August 3, 1994 edition of the
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then initiated an action pursuant to the civil False Claims Act6 seeking damages of $2,000
per false claim for a total fine of $130,000. Defendant’s false claims had caused actual
damages of only $585 plus legal expenses.
In determining whether the penalty imposed in the civil proceeding was
“punishment,” the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that “it is the purposes actually served
by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the
sanction that must be evaluated.”7
Furthermore, “[i]t is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance
punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals
may be served by criminal penalties.”8 Thus, the Court concluded that “a civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment . . .” for double
jeopardy analysis.9
The language used by the Court indicates its hesitancy in moving beyond the
particular facts if the case: “What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case
such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a provision subjects a
prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the
damages he has caused.”10
In light of the disparity between the actual damages suffered and the relief sought,
the Halper Court found that the civil penalty, which would have grossly overcompensated
the government, was a punishment because it did not serve a “solely” remedial purpose.
Halper indicates that if a “rational relation” between the size of the civil penalty and
“damages and costs” cannot be established, the civil penalty is presumed to possess
retributive or deterrent elements, and is therefore punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy.
‘Hudson’ Test
U.S. v. Hudson11 has used Halper to fashion a much more expansive reading of the
double jeopardy clause. Whereas Halper involved a civil penalty that was disproportionate
to the damages and costs suffered by the government, Hudson involved monetary sanctions
the reasonableness of which, in relation to “actual losses,” was not crucial to the Hudson
Court.
In Hudson, the defendants had participated in lending transactions that violated
various federal banking laws and caused alleged damages of $900,000. The Comptroller
of the Currency imposed “nonparticipation” sanctions, pursuant to which defendants
6

31 USC §§3729-3731 (1986 & Supp. 1994).
Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7.
8
Id. at 447.
9
Id. at 448.
10
Id. at 449.
11
14 F3d 536 (10th Cir. 1994).
7
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agreed not to enter any further banking activities without written permission from the
Comptroller, and administrative fines totalling $46,500. The government subsequently
indicted the defendants for criminal law violations based on the same lending transactions.
In challenging the criminal indictments, the defendants argued that both the
nonparticipation sanctions and administrative fines constituted punishments. If defendants
had been “punished” in the civil action by the comptroller, the government would be
constitutionally barred from pursuing the criminal indictments on grounds of double
jeopardy.
In analyzing the nonparticipation sanctions, the Tenth Circuit borrowed language
from Halper stating that “‘the determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes
punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty
imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.’”12
After examining the circumstances in which the nonparticipation sanctions were
applied, the Hudson court was “convinced that the government’s nonparticipation sanction
was solely designed to protect the integrity of the banking industry by purging the system
of corrupt influences” and was thus remedial in nature.13
However, Hudson reached this conclusion based on reasoning substantially
different from that employed by the Halper Court, which specifically stated that an analysis
of statutory language, structure and intent is insufficient to determine the nature of a penalty
in the context of the proscription against multiple punishments. Rather, the “violation can
be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the
individual …”14
Hudson reached its determination as to the solely remedial nature of the
nonparticipation sanction by finding only that the “‘penalty of debarment … is remedial
by definition.’”15 Under the Halper Court’s analysis, Hudson’s statutory analysis is
insufficient.
The Hudson Court separately analyzed the monetary sanctions imposed by the
comptroller. Whereas Halper was concerned with the disproportion of the penalty in
relation to the damages suffered, the reasonableness of the monetary sanctions was not
dispositive to the Hudson court: “Merely because overly excessive fines may be deemed
punitive … the converse is not necessarily true, i.e., a money sanction can be reasonably
related to one’s violations and still be used as punishment.” Rather, an analysis of the nature
of the penalty “will include a determination whether [the fines] were reasonable” in relation
to the injury suffered.16
In effect, the Tenth Circuit made the carefully crafted Halper test of disproportion
12

Id. at 540 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
Id. at 542.
14
Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
15
Hudson, 14 F3d at 540 (quoting United States v. Bizzell, 921 F2d 263, 267 (10 Cir. 1990))
16
Id. at 543.
13
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between the injury and the fine merely one of several factors to be considered in
determining whether the purpose of a particular penalty is solely remedial.
The Hudson decision also implies that double jeopardy claims may be raised in
circumstances where the conduct in question has been sanctioned and a second monetary
sanction is threatened under circumstances where no calculable monetary injury was
caused, such as margin violations, books and records violations and similar infractions. “If
there was no injury to be remedied, then presumably the fines were imposed to deter …
continued violations,”17 and were thus punitive in character.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently taken a position similar to that of the Hudson
Court, holding that a tax in the nature of a monetary penalty arising out of civil proceedings
can be punishment for purposes of double jeopardy, beyond the “rare case” and limited
facts of Halper.
In Montana v. Kurth,18 defendants were farmers who planted and sold marijuana in
violation of various Montana state criminal and civil statutes. After defendants received
prison sentences, they were assessed a “tax” pursuant to Montana’s newly enacted
Dangerous Drugs Tax Act. The U.S. Supreme Court examined whether a “tax” on the
possession of illegal drugs, assessed after the imposition of criminal penalties for the same
conduct, was punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause.
The Court acknowledged that the Halper “rational relation” analysis does not apply
to a tax,19 which is “usually motivated by revenue-raising” considerations unrelated to a
particular taxpayer’s actions.20 Yet the Kurth Court nonetheless found the imposition of the
tax to have violated the double jeopardy clause, based in part on the fact that the tax was
conditioned on the commission of a crime, and thus appeared to be a second non-remedial
sanction.21
Kurth indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court is willing to find a monetary penalty
to be punishment outside the limited circumstances outlined in Halper. Thus, as the Hudson
court understood, the Halper “rational relation” test is not the exclusive method for
determining whether a monetary penalty serves a “solely remedial” purpose.
Summary
Financial industry participants who have violated federal securities statutes,
banking statutes, commodities statutes, self-regulatory organization (SRO) rules22 or state
17

Id.
No. 93-144. 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4440 (June 6, 1994)
19
Id. at *32.
20
Id. at *24.
21
Id. at *26.
22
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the fundamental question of whether SRO sanctions are
subject to constitutional limitations being that the SROs are not strictly speaking, state actors. Compare
e.g., United States v. Bloom, 450 F.Supp 323 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (actions of NASD Officials were not
“government” action for alleged constitutional violations) and In re Abercrombie, SFC Release, Securities
18

4

“Blue Sky” laws may raise a double jeopardy defense in connection with multiple civil or
criminal penalties imposed in successive proceedings for the same offense.
Counsel should be aware that this defense would be applicable to proceedings
brought by a variety of government agencies (e.g.; the SEC, the Federal Reserve Board and
the Comptroller of the Currency).23
In conclusion, legal practitioners can anticipate future securities litigation to
challenge dual sanctions imposed by various regulatory agencies where distinct
proceedings are initiated with respect to the identical series of events. Moreover, the liberal
interpretations of the constitutional protections that Kurth and Hudson provided are likely
to be extended even further, perhaps even to SROs and other regulatory bodies in the
financial services industry.

Exchange Act of 1934 No. 16285, 1979 SEC LEXIS 491 (NASD is not a federal agency for purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination) with Intercontintental Indus. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F2d 935,
941 (“The intimate involvement of the Exchange with the (SEC) brings it within the purview of the Fifth
Amendment controls over governmental due process.”) and United States v. Sloan, 388 F. Supp. 1062
(SDNY) 1975 (defendant at NYSE proceeding can invoke privilege against self-incrimination and can
challenge the NYSE proceeding on Due Process grounds). While the cases holding that SRO action is not
governmental action correctly state the principle that merely being subject to regulation does not elevate a
private entity to the status of government actor, they are, in the authors’ opinion, nevertheless questionable
for a number of reasons, especially when an SRO is merely enforcing federal law. Cf. United States v.
Solomon, 509 F2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975) (NYSE interrogation of defendant did not trigger privilege against
self-incrimination since NYSE inquiry was in pursuit of enforcing its own rules).
23
Some further issues that have arisen from Halper ought to be briefly mentioned. First, Halper itself
involved a criminal case followed by a civil case. Nothing in the decision indicates whether the order of the
cases should matter, but the Hudson court explicitly stated that it is not relevant. Hudson court explicitly
stated that it is not relevant. Hudson, 14 F3d at 543. Second, nothing in present case law prevents the
government from seeking multiple punishments in a single proceeding, in which case a court will only be
concerned, in considering double jeopardy issues, that the “total punishment did not exceed that authorized
by the legislature.” Halper, 490 U.S. at 450. In addition, a civil penalty that is punitive can be levied so
long as a criminal penalty has not already been imposed. Id. Third, the double jeopardy clause does not
apply to a private party that files “a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previously was subject of
criminal prosecution and punishment.” Id. at 451. Finally, the standard the government must meet in order
to prove that fines are reasonable is uncertain. See U.S. v. Furiett, 781 F.Supp. 536, 545-46 (N.D. Ill.
1991), aff’d, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Certain courts have suggested that it is enough to examine
whether the monetary sanctions imposed upon defendant were in keeping with the expense of detecting and
prosecuting the type of offense which the defendant has committed. Others have imposed a more exacting
burden, requiring the government to show that the sanctions imposed upon a given defendant bear a
reasonable relationship to the costs of building its case against that defendant.”).
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